The last good options in Iraq evaporated long ago and getting out is likely to be more complicated and bloodier than going in. Whether they go north or south, the 160 000 American troops now in Iraq would probably have to fight their way out against disparate enemies keen to claim a military victory.
That daunting prospect and the woeful symbolism of the retreat (even worse possibly than the 1975 helicopter departure from the roof of the United States embassy in Saigon) are in themselves powerful arguments for inertia. The attempt to move forward, the surge, has so far borne few, if any, fruits while any attempt to edge backwards is fraught with new dangers.
But “staying the course” is also extracting a rising price. The administration and some US generals argue that it is too early to judge the “surge”, and that it will take longer for the efforts to beef up Iraqi security forces and to pacify Baghdad to bear fruit.
The surge has only reached its peak level in the past few months, and some argue there is a case to insulate it from the US political timetable to allow it time to make a difference. The coalition commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, has hinted that his briefing to Congress in September will not give the clear verdict on the state of the war, and the Bush administration is clearly hoping to avoid any decisions that could be interpreted by its supporters as an admission of defeat.
One option discussed in Washington pre-surge, which has resurfaced in the aftermath, is a retreat from the firing line in cities such as Baghdad and Baquba and into highly fortified, “enduring” bases around Iraq. From there, US troops would only emerge in the form of special forces raids or withering air power for specific missions in support of the Iraqi government.
The option promises to reduce US casualty rates radically (most probably at the expense of the Iraqi army) and therefore relieve political pressure in the US. It would also allow the White House to classify it as a redeployment rather than a retreat. It would make the occupation less visible and could therefore help defuse popular anger currently fuelling the insurgency, while leaving an essential military prop to the Baghdad government close at hand.
On the other hand, it could bring on the worst of both worlds, abandoning the government’s shaky forces on the streets while further discrediting them by prolonging the occupation.
A variant may involve a withdrawal to bases in the region, in Qatar, Bahrain and possibly Turkey, formally ending the occupation but retaining the strategic capacity to intervene under circumstances such as the threat of invasion by one of Iraq’s neighbours or the emergence of an al-Qaeda statelet in Anbar province.
Whether US forces withdraw to neighbouring states or pull out of the region altogether, they would still have to get out of Iraq, and that is likely to be a serious military operation.
Such a withdrawal could provide an incentive for Iraq’s politicians to make the compromises necessary to keep the country together, but it might also send them scurrying back into the shells of their ethnic strongholds. — Â