Short of his falling out of an SUV speeding the wrong way down Moscow’s traffic-congested roads, there was never any doubt that Dmitry Medvedev would be elected Russia’s next president. The out-going president, Vladimir Putin, who remains Russia’s most popular politician, picked Medvedev as his successor and, under the current system of media manipulation, no challenger had a chance of beating the Kremlin’s choice.
Selecting a man whose surname derives from the Russian word for “bear” is unfortunate. Western Russophobes have long used the animal as a national symbol to portray the country as wild and aggressive, though susceptible to being tamed if you can get an iron ring round its neck. Russians use the bear symbol themselves. But, as the West’s relations with Russia deteriorate, headlines about growls and sharp claws are bound to escalate.
The uncertainty centres on what happens once the new man takes power in May. Will he want to carve out his own policies and, if so, how will they differ from Putin’s? There are two theories on each question. Theory one starts by arguing that Medvedev was selected by Putin under a deal in which the former president would publicly announce his intention to become prime minister and continue playing a major role after leaving the Kremlin. This means that Medvedev will be the country’s titular and ceremonial boss while power shifts to the government.
Proponents of this version point out that Medvedev differs from Putin in one important particular. He has no career link to the siloviki — the so-called power men of the security services, army and Interior Ministry — which means he is bound to be a weak figure, subject to blackmail, pressure and threats if he tries to undo the authoritarianism of the past few years. This cohabitation of weak president and strong prime minister would continue until 2012, when Putin can run for the presidency again.
Theory two claims the opposite. Its supporters note that Russia’s 1993 Constitution gives the president the right to sack the prime minister — an article Putin has denied wishing to change. While Medvedev will not go that far, the argument goes, he is bound to gain status and authority by being the Kremlin’s top man. Ambition will entice him to want a second term, so even if there are no clashes with Putin in the early months of his presidency he will inevitably seek to distance himself, and even undermine Putin, as time goes on.
If this theory is correct, how will Medvedev change Russia’s course?
Most analysts believe the answer is: “Not at all.” Under Putin Russia has re-established itself as a confident and independent player on the global stage. Both he and Medvedev see the enlarged EU as divided and divisible. Why should Medvedev feel a need to fear it or make concessions? There are areas of tension, Kosovo being the latest, but they will not lead to a serious collision.
The US is another matter, and Russians across the political spectrum continue to be irritated by the American missile defence system being installed on their borders and the drive to enlarge Nato. But talk of a new cold war is exaggerated. More important, Russia feels the unilateral US interventionism of the Bush years is on the way out and that, whoever takes over the White House, American power is on the decline. So Moscow can afford to stay calm.
Nor will Medvedev change Russia’s system of authoritarian democracy. He is a manager, not a visionary; a bureaucrat, not an intellectual; an executive, not an innovator. The critical mass of Russian society has always been conservative, forcing radical reformers into frustration and dissidence. The same is true today, sad though it is after the hopes and promise of the Gorbachev years. But Russia’s chattering class is still enjoying enough wealth and freedom to travel and consume so as not to be concerned about the regime’s clampdown on human rights, opposition parties and NGOs that have political agendas.
The only likelihood of change relates to the economy. One theory says Medvedev will continue Putin’s drive to reassert state control over the natural-resource monopolies that had fallen into oligarchic hands. The other says he will look for more private-public partnerships in modernising infrastructure, provided the state decides the priorities.
Analysts have been poring over a speech Medvedev gave in Krasnoyarsk two weeks ago in which he talked of diversifying the economy away from its dependence on energy revenues and appointing independent directors, rather than government officials, to boards of state-owned companies. But this is tinkering. Putin would probably have done the same himself. Reliance on oil and gas exports cannot go on for ever, even if prices look set to remain high for some years.
So continuity is the name of the game. You can call Sunday’s change “From Putin to Putin”. You can dub the new man “Putvedev”. Those who thought Western-style liberal democracy had won the cold war did not get it right. The authoritarian modernisation by way of state-controlled or state-subsidised mega-corporations in an essentially one-party polity, which Japan, South Korea and Indonesia went through some decades ago is now under way in Russia — and, of course, China. — Â