A soldier patrols onboard the Chinese frigate Rizhao 598, ahead of naval drills between Russia, South Africa and China, in Richards Bay, South Africa, on Wednesday, Feb. 22, 2023. The exercises, known as MOSI II, have been criticized by some of South Africas biggest trade partners, including the US and European Union, who have questioned the timing of the exercises, which take place one year after Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine. Photographer: Waldo Swiegers/Bloomberg via Getty Images
South Africa’s joint naval operation Exercise Mosi II, with China and Russian forces in one KZN location to showcase their military capabilities, could be a golden opportunity for major players on the geopolitical stage to make use of surveillance of China and Russian warships and vessels over South Africa’s fairly unprotected air space, according to an analyst.
“It wouldn’t surprise me if many of the spy satellites will be watching South Africa over the coming days and weeks,” said Stellenbosch University’s Bruce Watson.
The three Brics nations are undertaking naval drills, including combat exercises, in the sea between Richards Bay and Durban as part of skills transfer that the host nation has undertaken with other countries, including the US, in the past.
But Mosi II coincides with the first anniversary of Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, which started on 24 February 2022. South Africa hosting Russian president Vladimir Putin’s forces — vastly superior in power, skills and machinery — has been met with disapproval among diplomats and opposition parties.
The possibility of Russia testing its Zircon hypersonic missile sent jitters though the diplomatic community. But, Captain Oleg Gladkiy, who is leading the Russian officers at Mosi II, said on Wednesday that hypersonic missiles would not be fired.
Since the invasion of Ukraine, South Africa has opted for a “neutral” stance. But, according to professor Michael Khodarkovsky of Chicago’s Loyola University: “It is particularly galling to conduct military exercises with the regime that invaded a sovereign country.”
“Neutrality is a thin fig leaf for the SA government to hide its own corrupt motives. Having joint military exercises is not neutrality. It is a clear signal of support to a regime that aids and enables every oppressive dictator in the world,” he said.
Mosi II was an opportunity for other nations to spy on the capabilities, said Watson, chair of artificial intelligence for cybersecurity at the School for Data Science and Computational Thinking at Stellenbosch University.
One suspected Chinese surveillance balloon was spotted over North America in early February and was shot down on the orders of US President Joe Biden.
China contends the object was merely a civilian-released weather balloon that drifted off course.
Three other unidentified objects suspected to be Chinese spying devices were also shot down: one in Alaska, one in Canada and one on the Canadian-American border.
Watson was speaking to the M&G after attending the annual Munich Security Conference. He said balloon surveillance was not a modern concept, and that some countries utilised it for non-malicious purposes.
Compared to spy satellites, spy balloons are closer to the ground and can take better images of the point of interest. The balloons could also “pick up a whole different class of radio signals,” that in the long term could provide valuable information, Watson said.
According to the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), it had detected no surveillance balloons in its air space, but it told the Mail & Guardian it had taken “note” of the suspected Chinese spy balloons.
Brigadier General Andries Mahapa told M&G last week that the SANDF had “the relevant sensors to detect and intercept any transgressions into the South African air space”.
Watson disagreed, saying that the balloons are “invisible” to sensors, given their altitude of up to 30km.
(John McCann/M&G)
“Most radar systems, including military radar systems, are set to ignore things above a certain altitude. The reason for that is weather balloons also go up there [and] you don’t want your system triggering all the time on weather balloons.”
Chances of picking up the signal of a spy balloon were slim, said Watson. He attributed this to the sophisticated design which allows limited transmissions downwards.
“The transmission upwards is almost impossible to detect from the ground. So that means from the ground they have no real signals that are detectable for us,” Watson said.
SANDF was also not in a position to shoot them down as it lacked the appropriate missile technology and aircraft to deliver the missile.
The US used its multimillion-dollar triple-threat missile, the AIM-9X Sidewinder, and its Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor jet — considered the best air fighter — to shoot down the suspected Chinese spy balloons.
SA’s Swedish-manufactured fighter jet, Gripen, “is just not kitted out” to fly the required altitude, he said.
Kobus Marais, a member of parliament’s portfolio committee on defence, told the M&G that only two Gripen jet fighters were in service.
“I think we have a relatively low probability of shooting [spy balloons] down,” said Watson.
“We’re not the only ones in this situation. Most other countries have this problem with a fighter jet that can basically get to half the altitude of the balloon and then fire a missile.
“And then you are hoping and praying that the missile can fly the other half of the altitude and successfully shoot it down.”
Watson said that given South Africa is a member of Brics, it could opt for a diplomatic approach to potential surveillance by investing in radar technology. It could also engage with China, or other countries, about removing surveillance.
But according to defence analyst Helmoed-Römer Heitman, instability in neighbouring countries like Mozambique and Eswatini are of greater concern to South Africa than surveillance balloons.
South Africa has nothing to hide when compared to the US and Europe, Heitman said.
Watson disagreed, and said South Africa “certainly punches above our weight in terms of military and electronic infrastructure” in Africa.
“We have things that are worthwhile mapping from our naval bases to our various other military installations. So there is reason enough, and it’s very easy for China to do”.