Gold medals: China President Xi Jinping and President Cyril Ramaphosa. Photographer: Michele Spatari/Bloomberg via Getty Images
The 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Summit is a defining moment in the evolving geostrategic significance of this economic bloc, with South Africa paving the way for China-Africa international solidarity.
The expansion of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa bloc has led to some policy uncertainty about the nature of Brics + 6. Russia has recently taken a stand against this expansion, given its war in Ukraine.
In contrast, the FOCAC has emerged as an increasingly stable economic development platform with the greatest amount of political commitment on the part of African states and China. Despite fault lines, which include rising debt in Africa — as a result of large infrastructural loans provided by China — the enthusiasm of African leadership is demonstrated by the number of leaders arriving in Beijing.
There are also plans afoot on both the African and Chinese sides to re-brand economic relations. In the pipeline is economic cooperation that departs from the controversial mega-projects that have characterised China’s economic expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative into Africa.
China is aware of the criticism levelled at investments that have been taking place in Africa. The criticism from the United States and European Union and the media, referred to by the Chinese media as a form of “blackmail”, depicts the Chinese government and its banks as rapacious lenders who seize state assets to pay back defaulted loans. The most notorious example is that of Sri Lanka, with the Chinese takeover of the Hambantota International Port.
The Chinese government and major lenders such as Exim Bank have shown a more committed economic approach to realising the risks of high expense transport projects in Africa and Asia. China’s changing priorities towards funding African development is illustrating that there is a willingness to adapt to African priorities and economic needs.
High risk investments that have not paid off have been renegotiated, protecting Chinese banks and African and Asian lenders. Two examples stand out: Kenya’s standard gauge railway line and that of Laos.
During the past year, China and Africa have amended their joint narrative on modernisation and development cooperation. The new story is said to focus on smaller projects with a greater emphasis on green energy and the digital Silk Route, including technology transfer and artificial intelligence innovation.
Large infrastructural projects will still take place. For example, earlier in the year, China pledged to revamp the Tazara railway line from Zambia to the port of Dar es Salaam — and will be done with greater risk analysis. Part of the reason is to avoid criticism from the US and Europe, but the main reason is to ensure that China-Africa economic relationships have long-term stability.
China has also committed to the Musina-Makhado Special Economic Zone (MMSEZ) in Limpopo, which will link South Africa to the Belt and Road through Mozambique. Further expansion may stretch down to Richards Bay and Durban, as well as to the Coega Special Economic Zone Deep Port near Port Elizabeth.
The MMSEZ shifted its energy supply from a 3300 megawatt coal-fired power station for a metallurgical cluster to a purportedly clean solar run energy supply, the Mutsho power plant. Although it is unclear where the bulk of the energy deficit will come from (it looks like it will be Eskom) the MMSEZ has side-stepped some controversy by this move. China has also promised to assist South Africa with its power supply.
In other developments intended to enhance the FOCAC solidarity vibe, last week, ahead of the summit, the New Development Bank pledged R5 billion to the upgrading of Transnet, which has been lagging in terms of freight capacity.
Despite the debt, and projects such as the Kenya Nairobi-Mombasa line not yielding the returns expected, geostrategically, relations look to be tighter than ever. This global display of South-South solidarity is a major planned outcome of the summit on the part of China.
As is being demonstrated with the pomp and splendour of the African leaders’ arrival in Beijing for the summit, the symbolism of equality and respect has earned the loyalty of the African Union and its leaders. The respectful note that is part of all FOCAC deliberations are in sharp contrast to the conditional loans and structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in the 1980s and 1990s.
Africa and China see beneficiation as a priority and there have been some wins. For example, in 2023 Zimbabwe added a beneficiation component to the joint Zimbabwe in Chinese endeavour regarding lithium. As a result, Zimbabwe is producing batteries instead of exporting the mineral.
Aside from economic cooperation, the main narrative at the summit is China’s emphasis on how important Africa is to China’s redefinition of Global South relations. China is ostensibly part of the South because of its history of having been exploited.
The Chinese government said recently that economic relations are now less important than the geostrategic relations between China and Africa and it places great emphasis on the principles of equality, fairness and mutually beneficial cooperation. There is an underlying soft-power leitmotif to this narrative that appeals to African leaders.
Should China lend its support to Africa’s goals in the arena of international fora like the United Nations General Assembly, it will affect the future influence of the US in Africa.
The US and the EU are trying to claw back infrastructural influence, for example, through the upgrading of the Lobito corridor between Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia. In response, China announced the upgrading of the Tazara line. African states can use this rivalry to be strategic about the battle for influence between the superpowers.
The significance of the cultural and technology transfer between Africa and China bodes well for African modernisation if it is done cooperatively rather than by dictate. It is also clear that China learns from its mistakes. In the case of the Kenya-Mombasa to Nairobi line, a major miscalculation about its profitability occurred because China under-estimated the dominance of the freight truck industry in Kenya. The truck sector has actively sought to thwart commercial containerisation and, as a result, the line is serving as a passenger service and making a significant loss.
As social media from both the critical left and more mainstream have emphasised, it’s up to African leaders and business to help define the parameters of the emerging relationships between the Chinese government and business.
The general consensus is that more coordination should occur and continental objectives should be prioritised. President Cyril Ramaphosa’s address on his arrival in Beijing shows promise for the increasing power of African states to call the shots on economic priorities in the FOCAC.
Lisa Thompson is a political economist and public sector transformation specialist based at the University of the Western Cape.