Many African countries are anxious not to be sucked into a new Cold War and want to maintain cordial relations with both Russia and the West. (Illustration: Getty Images)
Earlier in December a statue of the late leader of Russia’s mercenary Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and co-founder and commander, Dmitru Utkin, was unveiled in front of the Russian cultural centre in Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic (CAR).
They were killed last year in a plane crash in Russia, having just returned from Africa.
The unveiling of this statue was attended by the CAR army chief of staff, Zéphirin Mamadou, and Defence Minister Claude Rameau Bireaux in a ceremony alongside Dmitri Sytyi, the current boss of Wagner (now part of the Africa Corps) in the CAR, and his head of military affairs, Denis Suprunov.
The unveiling is part of Russian countermeasures to shore up its support in the CAR as French efforts to improve its diplomatic relations with that country seem to be bearing fruit, including the resumption of direct budgetary support.
Fighters from the Wagner Group have been in the CAR since 2018, when they were invited by President Faustin-Archange Touadéra to help tackle rebel groups and their numbers have been recently bolstered.
Central Africa is becoming of increased Russian focus. Up to 800 Russian security personnel have now been deployed to Equatorial Guinea to protect the presidency of Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, up from 200 in September.
Obiang, now 82 years old, has ruled Equatorial Guinea since 1979 and is the second-longest consecutively serving non-royal national leader in the world. His heir apparent is his son, Vice-President Teodoro Nguema Obiang, more commonly known as Teodorín.
He has been consolidating his power base and leading an arbitrary “anti-corruption” drive that has targeted his rivals, including family members, and heightened worries of another coup attempt, the most recent in December 2017.
With increasing Western political and economic disengagement caused by governance issues, Equatorial Guinea has sought a variety of security providers with mixed results: Russia is the latest. Moscow has been marketing its praetorian guard package for regime protection for some years in African states that many international partners, particularly Western ones, increasingly chose to avoid.
During a visit to Moscow in September, Obiang thanked President Vladimir Putin for sending these “instructors” to Equatorial Guinea and in a speech before the Lower House of the Russian parliament, the Duma stated: “Russia has always been a true friend of both Equatorial Guinea and the entire African continent, so I take this opportunity to express special thanks to the Russian people and government for the important work they have done for countries that suffered colonisation and apartheid, when certain nations dictated their own rules.”
Obiang also invited Russia to hold its next Africa summit in Equatorial Guinea, boasting that Malabo does not recognise the International Criminal Court, which has an arrest warrant out for Putin.
Russia’s deepening involvement in Equatorial Guinea is part of a pattern. Moscow has found a market niche supporting warlords, juntas and despots that the West has sanctioned or isolated because of staging coups, governance or human rights concerns.
Russia’s security deployments remain most significant in the CAR where up to 2 000 men have helped foil a coup, provided security and training and developed business interests, including gold mining and weapons deals.
The Africa Corps, the Wagner Group’s successor, has perhaps 1 000 men in Mali, up to 1 500 in Libya, less than a hundred in Burkina Faso and an unclear number in Niger and Sudan.
Putin claimed last month that Russia had “never exploited African peoples, nor been engaged in anything inhumane on the African continent”. His statement is part of broader Russian strategy of conducting hybrid warfare in Africa through disinformation aimed at expanding Moscow’s influence by portraying its engagement as benign compared with the West, especially France.
Trade between Russia and African countries is also slowly increasing, up to $24.5 billion in 2023. Russian business and African diplomats have however noted that Russia’s economy lacks the finances to pursue serious investment prospects beyond security, and limited mining and nuclear deals.
Russia’s main trading partners remain concentrated in North Africa with Egypt alone accounting for 28% of Russia’s total exports to the continent. The Russian Export Center records these key exports to Africa as machinery, grain, and hydrocarbon fuels although defence equipment is still a key export. Russian foreign direct investment contributes just one per cent of Africa’s total and its overall trade.
Russia’s political focus though is a lot broader, across the continent seeking votes or abstentions in international fora, such as at the United Nations General Assembly. Many African states do not wish to be sucked into a new Cold War and seek to maintain cordial relations with both Russia and the West. Several African states such as Angola and Mozambique were closer to Russia in the past but have become more circumspect.
The CAR’s Touadéra may also have concluded that too tight an embrace with Russia is not in his interest and the Mali junta is reflecting whether the bringing of Africa Corps fully under the jurisdiction of the Russia Ministry Defence aligns with Mali’s strategic vision.
Similarly, the Niger junta has not welcomed a large Russian security footprint and has continued to welcome the deployment of 250 troops of the bilateral Italian mission, MISIN.
Meanwhile the United States and Chad in September reached an understanding on the return of a limited number of Special Forces personnel, while Chad also announced on 28 November that French forces would no longer be welcome to be stationed in the country and have already started their withdrawal.
President Mahamat Idriss Déby visited Putin in the Kremlin in January and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was in Chad’s capital N’Djamena in June to continue the dialogue.
Late last week, a delegation from the Russian defence ministry travelled to Bangui and was to meet with Déby, but this meeting was then delayed till January 2025.
For some states like Chad and Niger, playing off Russia against past traditional Western partners is multipolarity in action as unlike Equatorial Guinea, Western nations retain an appetite to engage for strategic and economic reasons.
Many African governments wish to avoid Cold War style binary alliances but wish to embrace multipolarity — Russia included. Moscow currently punches above its weight, as its corporate penetration is thin, and its defence sales significantly down, losing market share especially to China and Turkey.
If there is a cessation of Russian hostilities in Ukraine in 2025, this could result in a flood of discounted Russian military material and battle-hardened personnel offered to the African security market beyond the Africa Corps.
2025 will see an uptick of the Russian security offer and more aggressive diplomacy in Africa seeking new markets and partnerships.
Alex Vines directs the Africa Programme at the Chatham House think tank.