Democratic Alliance (DA) leader John Steenhuisen. (Photo by Chris McGrath/Getty Images)
The Democratic Alliance (DA) has exasperated the presidency with public proposals on overhauling the government’s approach to South Africa’s upcoming G20 presidency, escalating tension over foreign policy between the two biggest parties in the ruling coalition.
Ryan Smith, the DA’s deputy spokesperson on international relations, has issued a statement suggesting that the inter-ministerial committee (IMC) on the G20 should serve as the “government of national unity’s foreign policy engine room”.
Shortly after the government of national unity (GNU) took office the committee was assembled as a technical coordination structure and counts 21 ministers, including four from the DA — party leader and Agriculture Minister John Steenhuisen, Basic Education Minister Siviwe Gwarube, Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment Minister Dion George and Communications and Digital Technologies Minister Solly Malatsi.
Smith acknowledged that groundwork for the G20 presidency, which South Africa assumes on Sunday, began well before the unity government was formed but said “all activity henceforth must be a product of the GNU”.
His call to elevate the mandate of the inter-ministerial committee is part of increasingly insistent demands by the DA for a recalibration of foreign policy to accommodate its views, which diverge from the ANC’s at key junctures, including Russia and Israel.
“Our G20 Summit is South Africa’s very first step into the international arena as a state under the direction of a plurality of parties and voices, and this more holistic representation of South African society within our national government must now reflect in our international engagements,” Smith continued in the statement.
The IMC must serve as “the platform where the GNU foreign policy can be developed and ratified in conjunction with our G20 theme, using the constitution and the GNU statement of intent as its policy compasses”, he added.
Smith’s communique is a shortened version of a seven-page letter sent to President Cyril Ramaphosa on Thursday, but it included a link to the full text.
The letter had not reached Ramaphosa’s desk by the time it was published, according to his presidency, who dismissed it as a publicity stunt.
“This is another form of overreach and continuous attempts by the DA in parliament at contesting the president’s exercise of his functions,” Ramaphosa’s spokesperson, Vincent Magweyna, told Mail & Guardian.
“They now have ministers in cabinet who could have raised their proposal on the G20 directly with the president or the ministers of finance and international relations and cooperation,” he said. “Instead, they’ve opted for another PR stunt.”
Magwenya suggested that the DA’s foreign policy team might more appropriately have approached Zane Dangor, the director general of international relations and the government’s lead sherpa on the G20 “if they meant to be constructive in their approach”.
He added that by nature the remit of an inter-ministerial committee was a technical one.
“There’s no IMC that can usurp the legal mandate and the responsibilities of line departments. IMC’s are cabinet coordinating structures.”
DA strategists believe it is unreasonable of the ANC to ring-fence foreign policy from its coalition partners.
But the party’s demands in this regard have hit a brick wall, with the ANC countering that the DA in coalition negotiations demanded concessions on health and education policy but never raised a rethink of diplomacy as a pre-condition for entering government.
Five months later, the parties have yet to resolve their differences over the National Health Insurance Act and Basic Education Amendment Laws Act. The standoff over international relations have added further friction to their relationship.
So has Malatsi’s decision to withdraw the SABC Bill without consulting the cabinet on the step.
In the letter to Ramaphosa, Smith touched on contested domestic policy terrain by way of complaint that the department of international relations and cooperation (Dirco) had not ensured more public sector involvement in G20 workstreams.
“While Dirco has approached Investec as a private sector partner in its G20 presidency, it is unfortunate that no other private sector partnerships have yet been forged to assist in hosting South Africa’s summit,” he wrote.
“This must be addressed urgently, especially in sectors relating to public healthcare and education, communications and digital technology, and public financing.”
The foreign policy spat started in earnest a month ago.
During the Brics summit in Kazan in late October, Steenhuisen struck a nerve with a statement criticising Ramaphosa for referring to Russia as “a valuable friend and ally” in public comments to President Vladimir Putin.
“We cannot and will not agree that South Africa should consider an authoritarian regime, that is currently violating international law by waging an imperialist war of aggression against a sovereign state, as an ally.”
Steenhuisen accused Ramaphosa of speaking on behalf of the state without prior debate in the coalition to achieve “maximum consensus” on the government’s position.
Several commentators suggested that, whatever valid reservations one could raise about South Africa’s relationship with Moscow, this was unfair criticism of Ramaphosa for showing customary politeness to a summit host.
Days later, Home Affairs Minister Leon Schreiber paid tribute to Ukraine’s historical support for the anti-apartheid struggle in a communique in which he claimed credit for an agreement to waive visa requirements for Ukrainian diplomats.
It drew a swift reminder from Ramaphosa’s office that negotiations on the waiver began years ago. Magwenya in the same breath said the clearing house established to resolve coalition disputes would not entertain the DA’s objections to the department of international relations’ demand that Taiwan move its liaison office from Pretoria to Johannesburg.
“It cannot be bogged down by daily DA tantrums.”
Ramaphosa has not privately raised the foreign policy standoff with Steenhuisen, nor has International Relations Minister Ronald Lomala.
But sources close to both said the DA risked undermining the government’s political agenda for the G20 presidency, as well as perceptions of the stability of the coalition.
Ramaphosa and Lamola intend using G20 engagements to lobby influential member nations for support for South Africa’s position on the reform of multi-lateral institutions, starting with the United Nations Security Council.
In remarks to the hybrid plenary of the National Council of Provinces, Ramaphosa reiterated that the G20 presidency should be an opportunity to amplify the voice of the Global South.
The DA suggested that South Africa should prioritise the reform of African multilateral institutions to promote democracy and development on the continent.
“This includes conversations around potential reforms within the African Union and SADC [Southern African Development Community] and, perhaps to a lesser degree, amendments to the structure of the United Nations Security Council for greater representation of African and developing world countries,” Smith wrote.
Senior government sources privately described the letter to the president as condescending.
They reiterated that the ANC, as the biggest party in the coalition, considered foreign policy non-negotiable, and said it would not be reviewed to appease coalition partners.
“It will never happen,” one said on Thursday.