Rwanda President Kagame hosted a dinner with members of Congress including Senator Mike Rounds, Chairman Brian Mast, Senator Kevin Cramer, Senator Pete Ricketts, Representative Ronny Jackson and Representative Trent Kelly during his visit to the US. (Instagram)
On Thursday, Presidents Felix Tshisekedi of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Paul Kagame of Rwanda met in Washington to formally sign a US-brokered peace deal aimed at resolving the protracted security crisis in Eastern DRC.
The accord comes after months of delicate negotiations. Kinshasa, which had previously offered minerals deals to the Trump Administration in exchange for US protection against what it considers Rwandan aggression, hailed the deal as “historical.”
However, Kigali successfully steered the narrative during negotiations. The final document mentions the lifting of Rwanda’s defensive measures rather than the withdrawal of its troops.
This outcome refutes President Tshisekedi’s insistence on calling Rwanda an “aggressor,” instead recognizing it as a nation with legitimate security concerns stemming from over 250 militias operating near its border, including the Kinshasa-backed genocidal force, the FDLR.
Rwanda Government Spokesperson Yolande Makolo praised the Trump administration for “approaching the mediation in the right way by focusing on the real obstacles to peace.”
Since the two nations’ foreign ministers initially signed a version of the accord in June little has changed on the ground. Both sides have since accused the other of failing to implement the agreement. Since 2 December 2025, tensions flared again with a violent clash betweenthe Congolese army and the M23 group in South Kivu. The M23 claims to be fighting to protect civilians and the DRC army is employing drones, fighter jets, and Burundian army’s long-range artillery being fired from Burundian territory to regain ground lost to M23.
The resumption of fighting casts doubt on the Washington Accord’s capacity to bring about tangible change. A key element of the conflict, and central to the accord, is the issue of the Kinshasa-backed Rwandan genocidal force, the FDLR. The Washington Accord requires the DRC to neutralize the FDLR before Rwanda lifts its defensive measures (what the DRC terms a withdrawal of Rwandan troops).
For many analysts, achieving the neutralization of the FDLR will be exceptionally challenging without genuine political will and significant reform of the Congolese army. UN Group of Experts reports have repeatedly documented how the FDLR has been tolerated, incorporated, or politically instrumentalized by factions within the Congolese security and political apparatus.
While the DRC claims to have begun the neutralization process inSeptember, no notable disarmament or repatriation of FDLR members has yet been observed.
Meanwhile, the DRC government continues to accuse Rwanda of supporting the M23, an accusation Rwanda denies. Critically, the M23 issue is not directly addressed in the Washington Accord. More than ever, the overall regional peace and security depends on the success of the ongoing Doha Process. Without a resolution in Doha, the Washington Accord risks following the path of other unfulfilled peace agreements.
The Doha Process itself has stalled; in November 2025, the DRC government and the M23 agreed on a framework of eight protocols for a final peace agreement, yet only two—the exchange of prisoners and the ceasefire verification mechanism—have been finalized.
The 15-day timeline set for negotiating the remaining six protocols, which include humanitarian aid, the return of refugees, and security dispositions, has passed with no reported progress.
The Washington Accord is not a binding treaty, relying instead on the political will of both countries. This lack of obligation could become an obstacle, with both nations potentially moving slowly to reinforce their own positions. Already, the DRC is dedicating 30% of its 2026 budget to defense and security. It remains to be seen whether the symbolic weight of the White House will succeed in bridging divides that neither previous negotiations nor diplomatic pressure have managed to narrow.
However, a differentiating element of this deal is the inclusion of the Regional Economic Integration Framework, which President Trump hopes can create strong economic systems to prevent the peace deal from collapsing. Trump is betting that economic cooperation and American investments in key sectors—including minerals, infrastructure, and energy—will provide sufficient incentives for Rwanda, the DRC, and other regional countries to abide by the agreement.
Given the transactional and impatient nature of the Trump administration’s diplomatic approach, the US may not maintain a prolonged focus on ensuring the complex Washington Accord comes to fruition if complications persist. Instead of continuing to press for full implementation of the fragile peace deal, Washington may choose to pivot, prioritizing separate, bilateral economic agreements and investments with Rwanda and the DRC to secure its commercial and strategic interests.
The lure of American investment and economic partnership could ultimately eclipse the current comprehensive peace framework as the central focus of US engagement in the region.