Mangosuthu Buthelezi and his Inkatha Freedom Party lieutenants – with help from the right wing, the police and former Vlakplaas operatives – hatched an elaborate plan before the 1994 elections to ensure the Zulu nationalist party had a military force able to resist the incorporation of KwaZulu into an African National Congress- ruled South Africa.
Interviews with three agents directly involved in the operation show the KwaZulu government, of which Buthelezi was chief minister, used millions of rands of taxpayers’ money between September 1993 and the eve of the elections in April 1994 to train — arguably illegally — a reserve of up to 8 000 paramilitary fighters. It is believed the Inkatha army was the subject of an investigation by the Investigative Task Unit which was recently disbanded.
The Transvaal attorney general is investigating possible criminal charges in connection with the operation. In spite of protestations from key IFP officials that the project had been privately funded, the KwaZulu-Natal auditor general pronounced last year that there had been about R6,7-million “unauthorised state expenditure”.
There are fears the warrior network is still partially intact and could be mobilised – with an arsenal of sophisticated war matriel hidden in KwaZulu-Natal — if the Zulu nationalist movement opts for a militaristic way of dealing with the ANC-controlled central government.
In the final weeks before the elections, well over 1 000 of the trainees were temporarily incorporated into the now- disbanded KwaZulu Police (KZP), where they were allegedly to have formed the core of an unofficial army loyal to the self- governing territory’s IFP rulers — despite objections from KZP commissioner Roy During that the appointment of the paramilitary fighters was irregular.
The training coincided with the IFP’s continued absence from the multi-party negotiations at Kempton Park and refusal to participate in the elections, a stand it reversed only a week before voting started. During this time KwaZulu and Natal were engulfed in the worst political violence in recent history.
Violence monitors say there were more deaths in KwaZulu-Natal at the time of the training. There were allegations that IFP Self-Protection Unit (SPU)graduates were responsible for much of the mayhem. The project blurred distinctions between the IFP’s party-political agenda, the then-KwaZulu government and the now disbanded KZP. The top command of the old South African Police (SAP), including then- commissioner Johan van der Merwe and his deputy, Basie Smit, allegedly knew of and abetted the project.
The Mail & Guardian has established that in mid-1993 an initial attempt was made under IFP central committee member Walter Felgate to revive the relatively uncoordinated and small-scale training of IFP recruits that had been a feature of the regional conflict since the former South African Defence Force (SADF) extricated itself, in the early 1990s, from its covert training and operational support of IFP warriors.
Affidavits from men who took part in the new training – and evidence from the trial of former Vlakplaas commander Eugene De Kock — suggest these were follow-ups, although without clear SADF backing, to Operation Marion, the covert programme launched in the mid-1980s by the SADF Department of Military Intelligence to create an anti-ANC paramilitary bulwark for the IFP.
Rightwing extremist former special forces soldier Willem Ratte was employed, under one Riaan van Rensburg, to do the actual training at a farm in the old KaNgwane homeland. But the Felgate initiative fizzled out in December 1993 — disowned by Buthelezi.
Meanwhile, IFP legislator and former SAP security branch agent Philip Powell had become involved in a much more ambitious programme to train IFP SPUs in September or October 1993. Powell, who has also been connected by De Kock to the SADF front company Longreach, has been tipped to become MEC for safety and security in KwaZulu-Natal.
Until April 1994 between 5 000 and 8 000 men and women were trained at Mlaba Camp near Ulundi (and to a lesser extent at the nearby Emandleni-Matleng Camp). While the IFP and KwaZulu government claimed they would be deployed as defensive SPU members allowed under the National Peace Accord, witness statements suggest instruction included offensive tactics – including sabotage and ambushing.
After the training courses, which lasted about six weeks, the recruits were sent to their communities with instructions to train others and form SPUs. The instructors included Powell as Mlaba camp commander, deputy commander Thompson Xesibe and one M Twala — all three IFP officials. Xesibe had been prominent among the IFP trained during Operation Marion by the SADF in the Caprivi.
As many as two dozen more Caprivi graduates, most or all of them by then KZP members, assisted in the training, suggesting a blurring of responsibility between the KZP, the IFP and the KwaZulu government.
Enter De Kock and his crowd from the then- disbanded SAP Vlakplaas hitsquad: De Kock testified in his trial last year that on Powell’s request he had obtained six truckloads of weaponry – including explosives, ammunition, mortars and grenades – from the state arms company Mechem in October 1993. Much of this weaponry remains untraced, leading to fears that some IFP trainees may still have access to it.
A number of witness statements say former Vlakplaas officer Nicolaas Vermeulen and a number of Vlakplaas askaris went to Mlaba, where they also helped with the training. Other evidence suggests a few rightwingers, including Ratte, did the same. In the final weeks before the elections, Buthelezi’s cabinet ordered that at least 1 000 of the trainees be incorporated into the KZP as special constables.
The incorporation was conceived by Powell as a basis for an unofficial army, loyal to the KwaZulu government. Incorporation of the recruits into the KZN might have been a ploy to bypass legal restrictions which prevented KwaZulu, like other self-governing territories, from setting up its own army. Powell also feared the creation of a formal army could trigger armed intervention from the South African government.
The KwaZulu cabinet, worried that KwaZulu could meet a similar fate to Bophuthatswana, appears to have accepted Powell’s plan lock, stock and barrel on March 15 1994. Then, the IFP was still holding out against joining South Africa’s first democratic elections. Soon after, the plan was in full swing. Application was made to the KwaZulu Public Service Commission for the creation of 2 000 special constable posts.
Press reports at the time show that KZP Deputy Commissioner Sipho Mathe finalised a deal to collect 1 000 LM4 rifles from the parastatal Eskom at a cost of R2,1-million. The arms deal collapsed two days later when an Eskom executive chanced on Powell and others loading the weapons at an Eskom facility onto KZP lorries.
The Goldstone Commission subsequently found Eskom had not officially sanctioned the deal — and that SAP commissioner General Johan van der Merwe had personally authorised a permit to make the “export” of the weapons to KwaZulu possible. In early April, Buthelezi instructed During to speed up the incorporation process – allegedly ordering him to accept all identified trainees into the KZP immediately, and that details such as screening and further training could be done later.
During is understood to have ignored the instruction, insisting that poorly trained recruits in the KZP could have serious implications for his force. Nevertheless, 1 200 or more trainees were reassembled at Mlaba to begin additional training as “special constables”. During applied for R14-million in additional funds from the KwaZulu treasury in the week before the elections, saying 1 500 extra policemen had been employed under cabinet instructions.
The IFP plan came to an abrupt end on April 25 and 26, as the vote was about to start, when the “special constables” were paid off at Mlaba and sent home. While the reason for the termination is not clear, the IFP’s decision a week earlier to join the elections, During’s opposition, and a joint SAP-Transitional Executive Council (TEC) raid on Mlaba on April 26 could have contributed.
The TEC raid group believed at the time that the Mlaba trainees had been forwarned. When the group got access to the camp it was largely deserted, although some grenades, ammunition, and more than 100 firearms were found.
Powell this week denied the incorporation of Mlaba trainees into the KZP had been to establish an army, saying it was to boost the KZP’s limited capabilities in case of large-scale civil unrest. He referred further comment to Buthelezi, who was not available.