/ 19 November 1999

Too little, too late for Congo

Peace moves by international groups are unlikely to save the Congo ceasefire, writes Ivor Powell

The international community finally moved this week to shore up the ceasefire agreements among belligerents in the Democratic Republic of Congo – but the action will almost certainly prove far too little and pathetically late.

With the Lusaka ceasefire agreement already in tatters, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) dispatched a group of 15 observers to Kabinda this week after earlier, erroneously, claiming that 300 observers were already in place.

Meanwhile, a 12-member United Nations logistical team embarked on a tour of rebel-held cities to prepare for the deployment of a more substantial peacekeeping presence. The departure of this group was effected only after three weeks of intense and frustrating negotiations with rebel leaders and their Rwandan and Ugandan backers, while military forces on all sides rearmed and prepared for renewed hostilities.

Another minor victory was achieved by the UN when Congo leader Laurent Kabila was persuaded to allow a group of 50 UN observers to stay on in Kinshasa, reversing an earlier order for the group’s expulsion. Another UN monitoring group of more than 20 officials is currently positioned at Gbhadolite.

By any analysis, this a laughably inadequate international presence to oversee the peace process in a country more than three times the size of South Africa.

However, the role of the international community was carefully circumscribed in terms of the ceasefire agreements. The failure of bodies like the UN to set up mechanisms on the ground is largely the result of the failure of belligerents to get joint ceasefire mechanisms off the ground.

For the moment the UN and OAU officials will serve hardly more than an on the ground intelligence gathering function, analysts say.

“It’s not much,” says security analyst Hannelie de Beer of the Institute for Security Studies. “But with monitors in place, at least we’ll be in a better position to verify claims of ceasefire violations. At the moment information coming out is so unreliable there’s no way of distinguishing truth from propaganda.”

On Monday the European Union promised 1,2-million euros to cover the operational non-military expenses of a joint military commission. In theory, this money will be added to the R1- million already pledged by South Africa towards the as yet non-functional commission.

In terms of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement, the commission is tasked with the major functions of peacekeeping. The UN was to play only an auxiliary role in conjunction with the commission.

According to South African foreign affairs representative Vincent Hlongwane, the whole process remains on track: “We do expect from time to time that there will be problems. It’s expected because of the nature of the country.”

He added: “It is our opinion that the ceasefire will hold and there is nothing to suggest it will collapse.”

But even before the EU’s funding was announced, the commission appeared to be falling apart as war clouds gathered. Both Rwanda and Uganda withdrew their senior military representatives from the commission.

In Kinshasa this week Kabila described his opponents on a local radio broadcast as “adventurers, Rwanda’s dogs …”, and said: “We will be victorious, I promise you.”

Kabila’s government has also declared a night-time curfew in Kinshasa to ensure security, claiming that the capital was being infiltrated by agents of the enemy.

Kabila is reported to have acquired six Antonov aircraft as well as a range of military transports as his offensive, focused in the east and north-east of the country, has escalated. On Thursday last week, one of the Antonovs exploded as it attempted to make a forced landing after being hit by rebel fire during a botched bombing mission.

Rebel representatives reported pitched fighting as Kabila’s forces continued their offensive in the north-west Equatoria province. They also claimed that new fronts had been opened in the Boende region in the centre of the country. Thus far military action appears to have been directed against Jean-Pierre Bemba’s Ugandan-backed Movement for the Liberation of Congo in the northern parts of Congo.

But, with independent intelligence failing to come through, it remains uncertain how much military aggression is really taking place – and how much disinformation.

l Unfolding regional dynamics could lead to dramatic escalations in the conflict in months to come. This week Zimbabwe’s Minister of Defence Moven Mahachi met with the Angolan government in Luanda to discuss military co-operation and the conflict in Congo. Mahachi said neither his country nor Angola had any intention of withdrawing from Congo.

Recent reports have indicated that Zimbabwe had earlier committed troops in support of the Angolan government’s ongoing offensive against the rebel Unita – an offensive which could see dramatic changes to the political geography of conflict- ridden Angola, conceivably the final defeat of Unita, but more probably its retreat to a downscaled guerrilla war.

On Monday the head of Angola’s army, Joao de Matos, told Angolan state television that his army was closing in on Unita leader Jonas Savimbi.

“We know where Savimbi is,” De Matos said. “We are tracking him, we are bombarding him every day and we are going to keep on until we capture him or kill him.”

While the prediction could prove overly optimistic, the Angolan government’s offensive has already seen Unita being forced to retreat from formerly secure strongholds, and intensified international sanctions against the rebels have cut off supply routes in recent months.

Angola has also benefited from increased co-operation from the United States, not only in helping to isolate Unita, but also, reportedly, in the form of military advisers and trainers in the guise of private security consultants. They have apparently been instrumental in beefing up the government’s artillery capabilities.

With Savimbi on the run, the Angolans could decide to mop up Unita-held areas in south-eastern Congo, and move to secure the position of their ally Kabila. They could also move to prevent Unita from gaining any foothold in neighbouring territories, especially Zambia.

Unless the current stalemate – which divides Congo into four de facto areas of influence – is decisively broken, and Unita denied support, the Angolans will not be able to secure long-term peace in their own country.

But the rub is that the same logic applies to Rwanda – who cannot afford to have Hutu interahamwe militias on their doorstep – as well as to the Ugandans whose primary target is rebel groupings in the north, massing to overthrow the Ugandan state.

And with none of the major belligerents in a position to back down, the stalemate and the de facto partition of the country into different spheres of political and economic influence could well continue into the next century.