George Ellis
A SECOND LOOK
The issue of racism is clearly strongly felt in this country, with deep divides between various views. It is therefore important that we are clear in our minds what we are talking about when we confront the issue.
As stated by Claudia Braude in her report commissioned by the South African Human Rights Commission (HRC) as part of its inquiry into race and the media, ”when documenting racism in the media, it would not suffice to rely on solely subjective and individualised standards by saying: ‘We know it when we see it.”’
But despite having said this, not she or the Media Monitoring Project (MMP), in its report to the HRC, or the HRC itself provide and adopt a clear definition of racism which they then use as a basis for their analyses. Given this vacuum, it seems that the media should take the lead in a public debate on this topic, and Howard Barrell has made a valuable contribution in this regard by his submission to the HRC (accessible on the DM&G website, www.mg.co.za).
I propose three substantial components of universal human rights, each of which is then associated with a possible aspect of racism.
Firstly, each person has a right to equal concern and respect as a human being. This means that they deserve both recognition of their personal value and conditions supporting a sense of worth and self-esteem. This is the fundamental starting point, but these rights are difficult to define and enforce. However, there are some actions that can be clearly seen as undermining them.
Secondly, each person is entitled to equal rights and opportunities in the political, legal, social and economic spheres (votes, homes, amenities, access to jobs, and so on).
The political rights noted here include the right to freedom of opinion and expression as set out in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; this is qualified by Article 29(2), securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others.
In implementing these provisions, apart from practical difficulties in providing equal access to legal, social and economic rights in many cases, the further problem is that the ability to utilise these opportunities often depends on access to resources (financial savings, for example) and on specific skills and abilities that many may not have, while some people are so disadvantaged they are in desperate need which cannot be met by providing the ordinary spectrum of opportunities.
Thus this equal rights provision should be interpreted as saying that there should also be a right to have opportunities to catch up, and to have special assistance when in dire need. Particularly important here is the lack of abilities needed to undertake specific jobs, so the whole theme of affirmative action comes into play, allowing those who are disadvantaged to attain better access to such opportunities.
However, opportunities carry with them responsibilities that are an integral part of the opportunities, and without them the opportunity is not real – for example, if I am given the title of managing director but actually someone else has the real power, then the opportunity is a fake. Thus, we have an equal right to the responsibilities that go with the opportunities. This means we have a real chance to influence what happens.
The implication is fundamental: there is an equal obligation on all those to whom opportunities are given to adequately fulfil the associated responsibilities, and that is an integral part of the right. Thus we should all be equally held to account for how we deal with our opportunities; if we do not use them responsibly, then our right to have them may fall away.
If I have been given the vote and then do not use that vote, then my subsequent criticisms of those elected has little validity. If I am given access to water and then leave the tap running all day, I am abusing that access. If I have a job to pay out pensions to the elderly and fail to do so, whether because of laziness, inability, corruption or simply not caring, then I should forfeit the right to that job.
The rider is that there will be some who are disadvantaged in this respect too, and need an opportunity to catch up. Thus there should also be an equal right, within reason, to have opportunities to learn how to handle responsibility, and hence to make mistakes. The corresponding responsibility is to show that one is indeed learning from this experience when one does make mistakes.
This leads to the third major right: given the recurring need for assessment to take place, we have the right to be judged on an equal basis with everyone else. When one’s performance is assessed, one should not be judged by higher standards than others, but also one should not be judged by lower standards, for to do so is to deny that one has an equal potential with others.
This is clearly crucial in art, science, and sport – for example, we want our cricket and rugby players to be judged by world-class standards. But it is equally true as regards our performance in the workplace, in public office, in running NGOs and in education. We want our matriculation certificates and university degrees to have real value, for example, and so are entitled to a quality assessment process that will enable that to be the case.
This is to be interpreted in line with the understanding of the previous paragraphs: if one is disadvantaged, one should have an opportunity to catch up; but that opportunity should not include lowering the standards to be attained. Any claim that I should not be judged by the same performance standards as other human beings is a claim that I am intrinsically inferior to them, and so should not be expected to live up to the same standards as they. That would be the triumph of the apartheid view.
Given these rights, each of them carries with it a claim to equality: society should offer them all as equally as possible to all its citizens. Racism, then, is the failure to offer equality in any of these areas on the basis of racial type. Thus, as pointed out by the MMP, it is to do with power and the use of power on a racially unequal basis, for each of these features is to do with how power is wielded in society.
Correcting racism means acting against such inequity. However, equality of outcomes is not sensibly possible: attempting to enforce it will result in a reduction to a lowest common denominator where nothing is of any worthwhile quality. What is possible, apart from a general provision of rights, opportunity and responsibility, is to offer each person some particular area where they can be advantaged, provided they are prepared to do the necessary work and take on the associated responsibilities. This should be done equally for all people, irrespective of race, creed and gender.
Finally, it is important to note that two current visions of racism are being rejected by the analysis offered here. Firstly, any definition of racism that is based on specific racial categories is itself racist and should not be countenanced. Thus Van Dijk defines racism as ”a complex societal system in which peoples of European origin dominate peoples of other origins, especially in Europe, North America, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand”.
The MMP quotes this with approval, stating, ”This definition is valuable because it recognises racism at the group rather than the individual level.” But in fact this is ludicrously specific, and hence is totally invalid – in this view only Europeans can be racist, denying essential human equality. Any valid definition must apply on an equal basis to all human beings – that is the heart of the issue.
The whole point of the remarkable democratic transition of the past century was that we went from colonialism to a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, not to the kind of restricted rights that might be embodied, for example, in a Declaration of Human Rights for People of Asian Origin Living in Malaysia, England and Australia. Any definition of racism with any validity must clearly be in sympathy with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by embodying in its definition that same universality of concept and application.
Secondly, any use such as ”if you disagree with me or criticise me, you are a racist”, is also completely unacceptable. This is an increasingly common misuse of the word that will bring it into disrepute and remove its original meaning.
This usage should be strenuously rejected both because it is usually simply a disguised attack on the right to free speech (particularly, it often means ”I am incompetent and/or corrupt, and want to prevent you saying so”), and also because if ”you are a racist” comes to mean ”I don’t want you to criticise me”, then we will be unable any longer to use the word ”racist” to describe the real phenomenon of racism. This usage will emasculate any efforts to deal with that phenomenon effectively.
George Ellis is a professor of mathematics at the University of Cape Town