The apartheid state used diplomatic bags to smuggle sensitive and often dangerous equipment rather than classified documents
Stefaans Brmmer
Department of Foreign Affairs documents suggest diplomatic bag facilities were regularly abused to smuggle arms components during apartheid – endangering the lives of airline passengers.
A file in possession of the Mail & Guardian shows how the department, led by then foreign minister Pik Botha, obliged in providing diplomatic cover to an assortment of South African spies and smugglers active in Europe, but also balked at excesses which would embarrass the apartheid state abroad. Foreign affairs officials appeared especially concerned about the concentration of Armscor officials and activity at South African missions in Paris and Tel Aviv.
The file, consisting of correspondence and memos prepared by top department officials, deals extensively with the “Blowpipe” affair, when the red-handed arrest in 1989 of an Armscor official stationed at South Africa’s Paris embassy exposed an arms-for- technology deal with Protestant terrorists in Northern Ireland. It was a sensitive blow to the apartheid government, basking at the time in international appreciation over impending Namibian independence.
Intriguingly, an official wrote in a handwritten memo at the time: “One wonders whether SAA [South African Airways] knows what they sometimes transport on the aircraft in sealed [diplomatic] bags? Mindful of the ‘Helderberg’ incident, an accident can also expose something.”
The official, writing to then the Department of Foreign Affairs Europe director Jim Steward, was referring to the SAA Boeing 747 that crashed near Mauritius in November 1987 after a fire on board, killing all 159 passengers and crew. The Cabinet will reportedly soon decide whether to re-open the Helderberg investigation after repeated allegations that the aircraft was carrying an illicit arms consignment.
The apartheid state’s use of diplomatic bags to smuggle sensitive and often dangerous equipment, rather than classified documentation as allowed by international convention, is corroborated by a confession apartheid spy Craig Williamson made to The Observer in 1995. He said parts for a security branch bomb targeting the African National Congress’s London offices in 1982 had been smuggled from South Africa using diplomatic bags, and assembled at the embassy in London.
Already before the Blowpipe affair broke in April 1989, senior foreign affairs officials were concerned about the activities of Armscor officials and the blatant abuse of diplomatic facilities. Herbert Beukes, then deputy director general for Europe, wrote in a secret memo to Steward asking that Botha be informed of “the dilemma in which we find ourselves as a result of illegal activities taking place within embassy confines and under diplomatic cover … The serious ramifications for bilateral relations of their actions, if uncovered, should be examined.”
In the same memo Beukes expressed concern over “the growing problem of Armscor representation in Israel” and “the question of the large number of diplomatic bags emanating from Paris”.
A handwritten and unattributed note sets out the convention governing the use of diplomatic bags, but says: “The RSA is, however, in a unique situation and sometimes has to make use of unconventional methods to stay apprised of technological developments.”
The note said parastatals and state departments other than foreign affairs could use the bags for clandestine purposes, as long as “the proportions do not make the diplomatic bags and [diplomatic] freight bags appear suspicious”.
Minutes show that at another top-level meeting in March 1989, officials refer to Armscor and the issue of “excessively big diplomatic bags”. Beukes asked that a message be sent to Armscor saying that “big things are happening and Paris and Tel Aviv are time bombs in this regard”.
One bomb did not take long to explode. On April 21 that year, Daniel Storm, an Armscor official operating under diplomatic cover from the Paris embassy, was arrested at a Paris hotel by French secret agents. Arrested with him were three members of the Ulster Resistance, a terrorist branch of the loyalist Ulster Defence Association.
International media reported that Storm (who was soon released because of his diplomatic immunity) had received a component of a derivative of the British Blowpipe missile from the Ulster loyalists, who had stolen it from a Belfast factory. In return, they had received weapons from South Africa – from which batch an RPG-7 rocket launcher was used to attack a Sinn Fein office in Belfast soon after Storm’s arrest.
The DFA file shows Botha writing to then president PW Botha confirming that the three Irishmen had visited South Africa a year earlier to be instructed by Armscor and Military Intelligence in the use of RPG-7 rocket launchers, but the foreign minister denied his department had prior knowledge.
The file reflects panic on the part of DFA officials about further exposes, and a desire to repair relations with an angry Margaret Thatcher, the then British prime minister and one of apartheid South Africa’s closer allies. Thatcher felt betrayed not only because Armscor had tried to steal British arms technology, but also because of South Africa’s association with a terrorist movement operating in the United Kingdom.
Yet, Thatcher was prepared to forgive and forget – provided South Africa guaranteed there would be no repeat incident.
On May 18 1989 director general Niel van Heerden wrote to Armscor manager Peet Smith informing him of the serious repercussions for South Africa’s relations with Europe, and referring to a letter Thatcher had written to PW Botha.
He quoted Thatcher as saying she appreciated “that you will make it clear to Armscor and its agents, who incidentally are still trying to recruit missile experts in Northern Ireland, that they should cease forthwith their activities in the United Kingdom.”
Smith emerged as a central figure in 1994 in the Armscor Yemen scandal investigated by the Cameron Commission, which recommended Armscor break all ties with him. But in reply to Van Heerden, Smith budged little. He told the Van Heerden that “switching off” the activities of his agents would be expensive and difficult, and insisted on further high-level consultations.
Smith did agree, however, to stop “diplomatic bag activities” for the time being.
Throughout the Blowpipe affair, officials repeatedly raised the diplomatic bag issue, without directly linking Armscor agent Storm with the abuse of the bag. But the implication is clear: Armscor agents like Storm regulary used diplomatic bags – regularly carried on SAA flights – to send arms or arms components back to their principals in South Africa.