A police headquarters investigation three years ago gathered damning evidence against Glenn Agliotti — giving the lie to police Commissioner Jackie Selebi’s claim that he did not know his friend was a crook.
The police investigation gathered evidence not only of Agliotti’s allegedly criminal activities, but also of his involvement with Palto, a squad of “freelance” operatives who used Selebi and the police as their cover.
Balaclava-clad and flashing police identity cards, Palto members conducted cowboy-style raids for contraband goods. Invoking Selebi’s name, they appeared untouchable. But these raids were not about fighting crime — often, it appears from the police investigation, they were turned into profit opportunities for Palto, Agliotti and other underworld figures.
While the media and opposition parties bayed for Selebi’s removal this week, Safety and Security Minister Charles Nqakula came to his defence, reportedly saying: “It will only be on the basis of concrete evidence that we will be able to do anything … in the absence of that we are not going to do witch hunting.”
Such evidence — in the form of sworn affidavits — has been available to Nqakula since 2003. The investigation was conducted by the serious and violent crime unit based at police headquarters in Pretoria. The Mail & Guardian has obtained copies of some of the affidavits made to Serious and Violent Crime investigators. They corroborate evidence separately collected by the M&G.
Selebi, it appears, was well aware of the Serious and Violent Crime investigation.
According to a source well acquainted with the circumstances, Selebi received a letter from Palto head Paul Stemmet complaining about the investigation. Selebi passed the letter to Divisional Commissioner Johan de Beer, to whom the Serious and Violent Crime investigators reported.
Yet, Selebi denied knowing of criminal allegations against Agliotti when the M&G first prepared to write about their friendship in May:
Selebi: “Agliotti is someone I have known since 1992 or 1994. I know him as a friend, finish and klaar … “
M&G: “Are you aware of allegations that Agliotti is allegedly involved in a criminal syndicate that is involved in the smuggling of tobacco, drugs and other contraband?”
Selebi: “I don’t know anything about that.”
At a press conference earlier this month — 11 days before the Scorpions arrested Agliotti for Brett Kebble’s murder — Selebi reportedly reiterated: “I don’t know of any criminal investigations of him [Agliotti]. If there are, they can go on.”
Selebi’s friendship with Agliotti is well known by now. His relationship with Paul Stemmet and Palto is more obscure.
Selebi told the M&G in July that he met Stemmet for the first time in July 2001, when police participated in a Special Olympics promotion in Cape Town with Arnold Schwarzenegger. Agliotti’s events management company helped arrange the event and Stemmet acted as Schwarzenegger’s bodyguard.
From the Serious and Violent Crime affidavits it appears that police involvement with Palto, formally known as a VIP protection company and majority staffed by former police special task force members, went back to about 1999.
According to an affidavit from Johannes Roux, then a member of a police crime intelligence unit in Johannesburg, he and others in his unit would moonlight with Palto on contracts to trace stolen computers and protect trucks transporting computer equipment.
By 2000 and 2001, the affidavits allege, Palto was indulging in extortion and dirty tricks. Former Palto member Chris Schutte confesses in two affidavits how he and Palto members threw an explosive device at Microsoft offices in Sunninghill, Johannesburg. “The purpose of this action was to convince Microsoft to use more protection services as provided by Paul Stemmet and not to injure or kill any persons.”
There were allegedly a number of similar “operations” during this time. In one case a prominent businessman wanted to “scare” a debtor living in Bryanston, Johannesburg. An explosive device was thrown first into the wrong person’s yard, and then into the correct target’s yard where, according to Schutte, the businessman wanted to make “sushi” of his debtor’s koi fish.
Roux describes another “job” — performed, his affidavit alleges, for Agliotti. He drove the car as a Palto member threw a hand grenade at a Randburg home where an Agliotti debtor lived.
There is evidence that already in September 2000, Palto conducted an “operation” as if it was a police unit. In this case, the same prominent businessman mentioned above allegedly wanted to get at a relative who he said had “molested” his daughter.
According to Roux, he and Palto operatives gained entrance to the target’s townhouse “by showing our [police] appointment cards”.
Once inside, Roux planted ecstasy in the target’s home and he was arrested. Charges were later dropped. Schutte corroborates the incident.
Palto members eventually all carried police appointment cards — they were “captains” in the police reserve. According to the person well acquainted with the circumstances of the Serious and Violent Crime investigation, Selebi had asked that this be arranged by the police crime intelligence division, which coordinated actions with Palto.
Selebi has previously denied that Palto, as a unit, worked for the police, but in July he acknowledged to the M&G that there was a relationship with Palto members individually. “There was never a front company for the South African Police Service [SAPS]. There was also never an arrangement between the [SAPS] and Palto as an organisation — there were people who were reservists.”
At the time, Selebi sought to downplay his relationship with Stemmet, suggesting the latter had created the impression by “name dropping”.
There is convincing evidence, though, of a close relationship. The M&G reported earlier how Palto and controversial PI company Associated Intelligence Network (AIN) sought a contract to train special police units in Sudan in 2002.
Representatives of both companies and a Sudanese official met with Selebi. An affidavit by Peter Otto, a businessman who was present, states: “Selebi confirmed to [Salah Mohammed] Saga [the Sudanese official] that Palto was authorised to provide the necessary training to Sudan.”
At the time, Stemmet, Saga and AIN boss Warren Goldblatt confirmed the meeting to the M&G, although their versions differed slightly. Selebi was not authorised to approve the training — by law, only the national conventional arms control committee, which regulates foreign military assistance, could have done so.
The affidavits made in the course of the Serious and Violent Crime investigation by Roux, Schutte and Charles Bezuidenhout, another policeman who had worked with Palto, describe a number of Palto operations targeting contraband smuggling.
These affidavits are corroborated by affidavits separately obtained by the M&G.
Agliotti and a prominent apartheid-era police spy, now businessman, feature repeatedly as the actual beneficiaries of these operations.
Schutte, Roux and Bezuidenhout each commented on the close relationship between Agliotti and Palto on the one hand, and Palto and the police on the other. Selebi’s name comes up repeatedly.
Bezuidenhout: “During March 2001 I met Glenn Agliotti … through Paul Stemmet. I later ascertained that Agliotti played a big role with regard to Palto, especially with regard to information about contraband cigarettes and other imported items.
Agliotti was or is still involved with the Italian, Russian and Chinese mafias. It was also put to me that Commissioner Selebi was aware of these operations.
Commissioner Selebi appeared at the scene at two of the occasions where I was involved.”
Schutte: “Paul Stemmet … mentioned that Palto received orders directly from Commissioner Jackie Selebi with regards to certain tasks that the SAPS cannot/does not wish to/may not perform, or as Stemmet put it, so-called “black bag jobs’.”
Roux: “Stemmet … brought me under the impression that he and his team … received special tasks from Commissioner Selebi. These people carried firearms all the time and other members of the SAPS visited Stemmet’s office regularly.”
The affidavits describe several forms of income for Palto. This income came from contracts with private companies for which Palto provided services; from Agliotti and others who allegedly were the true beneficiaries of Palto’s contraband-busting activities; from alleged extortion or the proceeds of Palto’s “crime busts” on the side; and, finally, from the police.
The police payments appear to have been as irregular as some of the others — the police intelligence division paid substantial “informer” fees to Palto, even, as Roux’s affidavit often points out, if the information on which Palto acted had originated with him, a police officer.
As late as last year Stemmet was still a police reservist. Johannesburg director of public prosecutions Charin de Beer confirmed that when Stemmet was arrested last year trying to “sting” police operatives who had tried to sting him in an illicit diamond buying exercise, he was a reservist. He was not prosecuted as another police unit backed up his version of the story.
De Beer confirmed dockets emanating from the Serious and Violent Crime investigation had been referred to her office for possible prosecution, but she would not give details as “investigations are at a sensitive stage”.
Selebi did not comment for this article, as he has made it clear he will not respond to further M&G inquiries. Stemmet has, in the past, also refused to comment.
The case gets stronger
Commissioner Jackie Selebi has told the nation that the only official business he ever did with Glenn Agliotti was to arrange for police involvement in a Special Olympics charity event involving United States actor-Âpolitician Arnold Schwarzenegger.
Now former Judge Willem Heath has flatly contradicted the commissioner, claiming the Kebble family used Agliotti’s access to Selebi to lobby him repeatedly over cases the police were investigating against Brett ÂKebble and his father, Roger.
Heath told the Mail & Guardian he had often been present at meetings with Agliotti to discuss the progress he was making in his discussions with Selebi about criminal cases against the Kebbles.
Especially important was the “Skilled Labour Brokers” (SLB) affair, which saw Roger Kebble charged with fraud that he allegedly committed while he was in control of the mining firm ÂDurban Roodepoort Deep. The allegations related to claims that he had siphoned off a portion of monies paid to SLB for his own benefit. The case was struck off the court roll in January 2005 after a series of delays.
According to Heath, over a period of two years, from 2003 to 2004, Agliotti met with Selebi once every two months “if not more often” to discuss this case and another involving alleged share manipulation by Roger and Brett Kebble during a failed takeover bid of another mine. “He would report back, and the Kebbles would give him instructions,” said Heath. Those instructions included giving Selebi relevant evidence gathered by Heath and other members of the ÂKebble security team.
“We were involved in investigations, gathering evidence that would point to their innocence, and [Agliotti] would give this to Selebi,” he explained.
Among the key documents that were given to the police commissioner, Heath says, was a legal opinion by Barry Roux, the state prosecutor in the case. The confidential legal opinion argued that there was no firm case against Roger Kebble.
“We were anonymously handed that opinion, and Agliotti passed it on to Selebi.”
Heath said, however, that he was disappointed with Agliotti’s progress with Selebi: “He would come back with some feeble excuse, we were not impressed at all.”
Heath has also confirmed that he and forensic investigator David Klatzow had been taken off the Brett Kebble murder investigation at Selebi’s insistence.
“We thought the reason was obvious, we asked questions the police couldn’t answer; we showed the holes in their investigation”, he said.
Klatzow says he was given conflicting information about why he and Heath were taken off the case. First, he told the M&G, Heath’s son, Marius, telephoned him to tell him that neither man was to play any further role in the investigation. “He said ‘I am sorry David but Jackie Selebi has told the Kebbles he is not happy with our involvement, so you and my dad are off the case.’”
By this time — early October 2005 — Klatzow said he was already focusing on allegations that Clint Nassif had played a role in the shooting and its aftermath, as well as the possible involvement of Mikey Schulz. He believed Nassif tampered with the evidence within minutes of the shooting. A month later, however, he got a different signal from Heath.
John Stratton, who was Kebble’s most powerful ally at JCI, and the head of his sprawling security and intelligence network, had said he should “lie low” for a while before getting involved again. Heath effectively reported to Stratton, as did Nassif and Agliotti. Heath this week told Moneyweb that Stratton had ordered him not to probe Nassif’s role.
According to JCI insiders it was Stratton and his team who compiled the dossier of “evidence” that led to the high-profile arrest of mining boss Peter Skeat, who was involved in a bitter dispute with Kebble. Both he and Kebble had boasted to others ahead of the arrest that they would use their influence with Selebi to deal with Skeat.
Case study one: ‘Undercover’ contraband
The relationship between Glenn Agliotti and Paul Stemmet produced a lucrative business based on payments to informers, intimidation and influence at the highest reaches of the South African Police Service (SAPS).
But a chance encounter on the road to Garsfontein in 2003 first exposed their criminal dealings, and would eventually lead to the unravelling of this symbiotic relationship.
At the end of January 2003, a truck belonging to Premium Transport was stopped by local police from Garsfontein outside Pretoria in what appears to have been a routine check. Inside, the police found boxes of counterfeit cigarettes smuggled into South Africa from China via Namibia.
Premium Transport was run by Anthony Dormehl, now a key state witness in the Scorpions investigation of Agliotti and other figures in the alleged smuggling network around him. According to affidavits made by Dormehl and other information obtained by the Mail & Guardian, both Agliotti and Stemmet regularly used Premium Transport to move contraband items. Both also often used an officer from the Pretoria serious economic offences unit, Inspector Charles Bezuidenhout, to lend a veneer of legality to their smuggling operations. All three men were involved in the Garsfontein incident.
About two weeks earlier, a truck carrying the cigarettes was intercepted by a “task team” posing as police, and led by Stemmet. On that day. Stemmet and a group of his Palto operatives stopped a truck from Namibia as it neared its destination in Midrand. The vehicle contained about 430 boxes of counterfeit cigarettes and the fake bust appears to have taken place on the basis of intelligence provided to Stemmet.
A truck belonging to Dormehl was summoned and the cigarettes were transported to Dormehl’s warehouse. Normally, seized evidence would be secured at a police station or authorised police warehouse. Bezuidenhout, who was on the scene at Stemmet’s behest, did not arrest the driver. Instead, he took the odd step of phoning the man’s boss in Windhoek to inform him of the interception. According to an affidavit from the driver, he was told by his boss not to report the matter to the police.
According to the most recent of several affidavits prepared by Bezuidenhout, Stemmet informed him that they needed money and wanted to know if a few of the master cases on the truck couldn’t disappear.
“I informed him that then the receipt and the total of the goods seized would not match up … Two days later Stemmet phoned me and told me Glenn Agliotti had sold about 50 master cases to unknown persons and that I must go to Agliotti’s office because there is something there for me … In the office on the table were various envelopes with our names on them. I took my envelope and opened it and found R4 000 inside. I don’t know how much other people got. Only Agliotti’s book-keeper was in the office when we were there.”
BezuidenÂhout says that about six days later Dormehl phoned him to say that the police in Garsfontein had seized his truck.
“I phoned Stemmet to find out what was going on and he told me the cigarettes had been sold to someone in the Cape and were on the way there.”
Dormehl’s version of the story is that Agliotti had ordered about 200 boxes of the remaining cigarette haul to be transported to Cape Town.
The shock interception by the Garsfontein police — who alerted the South African Revenue Service (Sars) — set off an attempted cover-up in which it was pretended that the consignment was being sent as part of a police undercover operation.
Says Dormehl: “I then called Glenn and he told me to say I had loaded the truck at the request of Charles Bezuidenhout, and that I was taking the boxes to Cape Town at the request of the police and that he [Bezuidenhout] had been lax in preparing the paperwork for them.”
A police source told the M&G that Stemmet phoned them attempting to secure the release of the truck and claiming that this was an undercover police operation that had Selebi’s endorsement. Garsfontein police demanded proof, which was not forthcoming.
Bezuidenhout’s affidavit confirms this version, saying Stemmet also phoned one of the police officials on the scene and introduced himself as Captain Stemmet.
Dormehl says: “To my knowledge, Bezuidenhout telephonically advised Zain Aboobaker from Sars that the delivery was a controlled delivery.”
Aboobaker was at the time national group manager of anti-smuggling at South African Customs Enforcement. A “controlled delivery” means that an action that appears illegal is actually part of an officially authorised undercover operation.
Indeed, in his first affidavit on the matter, BezuidenÂhout said precisely that, claiming he had not had the time to complete the necessary documentation to obtain authorisation because of rapidly moving events. He now says Stemmet told him what to say in that affidavit.
Agliotti also sent his lawyer, advocate Max Hodes, to sort out the problem. Hodes assisted Dormehl in drafting an affidavit.
Dormehl’s affidavit says he lied when questioned about the incident: “I did this because these were the instructions of Agliotti and I was under the impression that if I did this everything would simply ‘go away’, which it did.”
Not quite. The police conducted a cursory investigation of the matter. Bezuidenhout, who left the police service shortly after this incident, filed an affidavit claiming that he had such extensive experience in the investigation of smuggling that “Commissioner Selebi sends information through to me for me to follow up”. He claimed to have made use of Dormehl’s company for “controlled deliveries” as part of such authorised undercover operations.
However, Bezuidenhout’s commanding officer, Director Jacobus Nortje, filed an affidavit in which he denied Bezuidenhout was conducting any authorised undercover operation, and that Selebi had denied giving Bezuidenhout any direct orders to conduct operations. The police submitted these statements to the Pretoria specialised commercial crime office of the National Prosecuting Authority, where a decision was taken not to prosecute. — Sam Sole, Stefaans Brümmer and Nic Dawes
Case study two: Fake cops
Palto performed a number of contraband-busting operations in the name of the police, of which Glenn Agliotti and other underworld figures were the alleged beneficiaries:
July 2001 (based on the Charles Bezuidenhout affidavit)
Palto and the police anti-corruption unit launch an operation against one Naicker and a policeman, Captain Singh, who are dealing in contraband cigarettes. They are to be bust at a brothel in Boksburg. When Naicker and Singh arrive, Palto “descends on them and assaults them”.
Fifty or 60 master cases of cigarettes, worth about R700 000, are taken from Naicker’s bakkie. These are taken to Stemmet’s plot. In a follow-up operation, more cigarettes are confiscated from Naicker at a warehouse near Johannesburg International Airport. They are removed by Anthony Dormehl’s trucking company. Dormehl is now a state witness in a separate drug smuggling case in which Agliotti is implicated.
It later appears that 20 of the cases stored at Stemmet’s plot are missing, as are R200 000 worth of what Dormehl seized at the airport. Stemmet mentions that some had to be sold to cover Palto’s costs. Agliotti arrives and hands Stemmet a large amount of cash. Naicker and Singh were not prosecuted in the end.
Unknown date (Johannes Roux and Chris Schutte affidavits)
Palto descends on a warehouse in Bramley, Johannesburg. A Palto member identifies himself as a policeman by showing his reservist appointment card. Palto members break open the door. There is an “astonishing quantity” of cardboard boxes with (contraband) cigarettes marked “Peter Stuyvesant”.
A regular police investigator is called to the scene, but before he arrives Schutte and another Palto member remove many of the boxes — on the orders of a well-known former police spy, now businessman (whose name we withhold for legal reasons). The warehouse owners follow and film them, but the Palto members point guns at them and confiscate the video footage.
The regular policeman arrives and the truck is loaded a second time and sealed (as evidence this time). According to Bezuidenhout, Stemmet says that the ex-spy will pay Palto for the cigarettes (the first load, it appears).
According to Bezuidenhout, he later understood the point of the operation: “[The ex-spy] sells export cigarettes to an unknown person. As soon as he has sold it, he gives the information to Paul [Stemmet], who confiscates the cigarettes. Part is given to the police as evidence and the rest is paid to [the ex-spy] and [he] sells the cigarettes again.” — Sam Sole, Stefaans Brümmer and Nic Dawes