Democratic South Africa is an important actor on the world stage. This growing international and continental role requires thoughtful and constant consideration of policies and strategies to be pursued. Yet the ANC policy discussion document on international relations, A Just World and a Better Africa is a Possibility, released in preparation for the party’s June policy conference and its national conference in December, falls short of addressing these considerations.
Unlike previous discussion policy documents, which elaborated on the international and regional contexts, the threats and opportunities they posed, lessons learnt from our engagements and the production of a vision and strategies to guide us, this policy document is devoid of context, reflection and analysis. Instead, it merely points to old documents, and presents a lengthy series of questions to be discussed, such as what policies Pretoria should pursue to meet the aims of the Millennium Development Goals.
Through the hotchpotch of questions and ideas in this document we can, however, discern both continuity and shifts in the ANC’s foreign policy orientation. The central quest remains consolidating the “African Agenda” (though there are many of these floating around), promoting peace and security, and achieving greater equilibrium between rich and poor countries.
The shifts are related to South Africa’s positioning vis-Ã -vis other African countries. The ANC is increasingly moving South Africa away from the “I am my brother’s keeper” approach to one that seizes the economic opportunities available in African countries, although now seeking to regulate this through a code of ethics for business (with all the questions around enforcement immediately coming to the fore).
The document also floats the idea of setting up a South African International Development Agency. This would recast South Africa into the role of donor, with others becoming recipients, implying a dramatic shift in power relations.
The government has, over the years, provided extensive support to African countries emerging from conflict and has financed many of the “renaissance” initiatives on the continent. Officially naming this international development aid and channelling it through such an agency would lend itself to more accountability, but the attraction, I would argue, is more in terms of the accrual and projection of power that is embedded in being a donor.
The altruism that previously underpinned the discourse on our foreign policy is beginning to take a back seat as “South Africa Incorporated” begins to exert more influence on the foreign policy mandarins within the ANC and the government. This raises another question: How heavy a South African footprint can other African countries tolerate? It also demystifies South African exceptionalism, and shows that the African continent is an exploitable hinterland for South Africa, in much the same way as it is for other “donors”.
The ANC document calls for debate on whether the time is right for a United States of Africa, which will be the topic of discussion at the July African Union summit in Accra. The quest for a United States of Africa was the basis for the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity in 1964, and the formation of the AU in 2002 was seen as a further step in this direction. Indeed, the AU committed itself to the formation of a union government by 2015 (a magical year when all development challenges are supposed to be solved). Some of its key features would be a common monetary zone, a central bank, a common defence system, a Pan-African Parliament and common principles of governance.
The AU has worked far more vigorously than the OAU to establish common norms and values, peace and security regulatory and institutional frameworks, and to create a Pan-African Parliament. The African central bank has been in existence for a number of years. But the fact is that there is little political will to give substance to the idea of a United States of Africa. The continued emphasis on national sovereignty, the lack of regional integration, the inability and unwillingness to create an environment in which people and goods can move freely across borders, the marginalisation of the Pan-African Parliament, and the lack of capacity of the existing organs of the AU all indicate that we are very far from the ideal.
This does not mean that South Africa should give up on the idea, or postpone it indefinitely. There will never be a convenient time for African states to commit to the implementation of the goal of a United States of Africa (or any other name that might be chosen). This is a case of jump into the murky waters and sink or swim, if there is a belief in the principle. The push has to come from civil society, which paradoxically will be largely excluded from the debate. In reality, despite all the “people-centred” pronouncements, the AU is still run like an old boys’ club.
The discussion document also points to the tension between those who “favour more engagement with the external world as a way of promoting the national interest and exporting the country’s constitutional norms and values to other parts of the globe” and “those on the other hand who have isolationist instincts and some among them are even becoming xenophobic. They argue that domestic socio-economic challenges should be addressed first [rather] than wasting time and scarce resources on issues that have no bearing or direct and immediate connections.”
The document posits these positions far too simplistically. Though there may be those at the far ends of the spectrum who hold these views, for the majority the choice is not that stark. Rather, raising these issues highlights the challenges faced by South Africa and its citizens, and a cognisance that our engagements must be based on the realities of our capacity. For example, South Africa’s security forces are seriously challenged by both internal and external demands. To raise the issue is not to force a decision on whether we should now stop deployments. To the contrary, it is to focus discussion on how we improve our capacity to deal with multiple demands.
The perceived lack of buy-in to our foreign policy towards Africa (let’s call it this, for it is not blanket disengagement that is at issue) results from a lack of information on what the government is doing, what is informing its decisions, and its achievements and challenges. The policy document does recognise “a need to build consensus and a partnership with our people on foreign policy”. The Presidency and the Foreign Affairs need to do more work to enlighten and engage with the public in this regard. We cannot build consensus and foster partnerships on the basis of ignorance, so the time for openness and transparency and public debate has arrived.
We can only welcome the suggestion to have more parliamentary oversight of international affairs, and by extension greater public involvement. However, given the present trend in foreign policy alluded to above, this is unlikely. As the commercial imperative gains centre stage, the populace is likely to be sidelined.
There are many pertinent issues that have not made their way to the list of questions in the discussion document. How should South Africa, as official mediator for the Southern African Development Community, deal with Zimbabwe? What have been the benefits and challenges of the “quiet diplomacy” strategy? What should be our continued role in the Democratic Republic of Congo? What position should South Africa take on the US military’s new Africa Command? How are we going to strengthen our capacity to take advantage of the India-Brazil- South Africa initiative? What have we learnt from our experiences on the continent that can assist us with our internal challenges?
A just world and a better Africa are possible — but where do we place our limited energies to achieve maximum impact in realising these laudable goals?
Cheryl Hendricks heads the Southern African Human Security Programme at the Institute for Security Studies