General Pervez Musharraf’s plan to retain power as Pakistan’s civilian president is still intact, despite weeks of jaw-dropping blunders. But insiders say he will not last long, once a new government is elected and his army ties fade.
They predict his final posting, following a trail into exile blazed by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, will be duke of Knightsbridge or king of Dubai.
Musharraf’s decision to call an election on January 8, his resignation as army chief, acquiescence in Sharif’s weekend return, and gradual release of political prisoners have all helped put his pre-crisis plan back on track.
Officials say he is now under intense United States pressure to take the last, crucial step and lift the state of emergency, as demanded by US special envoy John Negroponte last week.
They add that only an end to the emergency can give the coming elections necessary credibility — although few expect them to be entirely free of manipulation. And only this will quell mounting alarm in Washington about the lack of political alternatives to Musharraf and semi-hysterical questions about who “lost” nuclear-armed Muslim Pakistan.
Pakistani officials suggest a private understanding that the emergency will end soon explains why President George W Bush spoke out so strongly in Musharraf’s support after Negroponte departed. To derisive guffaws from Democrats, Bush said the general “truly is somebody who believes in democracy” and who “hasn’t crossed the line”. But Bush is sticking to his hired gun.
Despite personal hostility to Musharraf and long lists of preconditions, both Bhutto and Sharif are preparing to participate in the polls. Bhutto said on Sunday her Pakistan People’s Party would take part “under protest” because “we don’t want to leave the field open for our rivals”. But other calculations are also in play.
The Bhutto-Musharraf relationship has deteriorated sharply since her dramatic return to Karachi last month. Yet despite everything, the pre-crisis mutual agreement brokered by the US is still salvageable.
“Musharraf and Bhutto detest each other. They both think of themselves as saviours. Neither is good at sharing power,” a senior official said.
“But this marriage was not made in heaven. It was made in Washington. Benazir does whatever the Americans tell her.” Both leaders were pro-ÂWestern and relatively secular and liberal in outlook, unlike the conservative Sharif with his strong ties to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s religious parties. And unlike Bhutto, Sharif insists he will not work with ÂMusharraf, who he has never forgiven for deposing him in the 1999 military coup.
The most likely immediate outcome was a coalition government led by Bhutto as prime minister, the official said, though the chances of her working successfully with Musharraf as civilian president were poor in the longer term.
“Benazir will make a bid for greater power as PM. The dynamic will be with her. So there’s going to be a big struggle.”
In prospect is a return to Pakistan’s so-called “troika politics” of the 1990s, when president, prime minister and military fought for the political upper hand, usually in two-against-one alliances.
This institutionalised power struggle, guaranteeing instability and strife, was also cast as a battle between the “three A’s” — “America, the army, and Allah”, not necessarily in that order.
Musharraf’s aim, since styling himself the nation’s “chief executive”, had been to lead Pakistan out of this self-destructive cycle, the senior official said. “The problem is, he’s paranoid now. He thinks everybody is out to get him — and he’s right.”
Musharraf’s legacy in foreign affairs, notably in improved relations with India and in growing the economy, was significant, a former supporter said.
The main opposition leaders were just as deeply flawed, while a highly politicised judiciary had sparked the current crisis.
But in his recent actions, say Pakistan’s “civil society”, Musharraf went too far, the source said. However hard he fought to hang on to the presidency, the probability was that, sooner rather than later, it would be wrested from him.
“His preference will be to hold on to power as long as he can, partly because he fears the consequences of letting go. But he will never be forgiven for the last few weeks.” — Â