Public function blueprints could go a long way towards addressing the serious concerns in government circles about provincial governments.
If it is clear exactly what is required by both the national and the provincial governments with regard to legislation, service provision, coordination and control it would not be necessary to make changes to the provincial government system and thus the Constitution — a very sensitive issue.
So argues Ian Robson, professor extraordinarius at Unisa, in the latest issue of the journal, Politeia. About two years ago the government announced a policy process concerning provincial and local government.
The background document issued at the time left little doubt that there was considerable disquiet in government circles regarding the country’s system of provincial government, to the extent that it questioned the need for provincial legislatures and even more broadly the need for provincial governments.
The review process is ongoing and is to culminate in a White Paper. On the face of it, the Constitution awards provinces with substantial powers. There does not appear to be a problem in the executive area where the provinces are extensively involved on a daily basis in the implementation and administration of laws and programmes.
In fact, large provincial administrations have been established to provide the many services for which they are responsible and at least 40% of all revenue raised nationally is channelled their way.
The problem with the provinces, Robson argues, lies in the legislative field, where the provinces are not performing, and in reality are being dominated by the national government. Several studies have shown that very little original legislation is being adopted by the provincial governments.
In his view, a major reason for this poor performance is to be found in the concept of concurrent powers, introduced in the 1993 Constitution and perpetuated in the 1996 Constitution. Under the concurrent power provision, the national and the provincial governments have equal powers of legislation in an extensive array of so-called functional areas.
Specific areas of responsibility are not delineated, meaning that there is no clear division of legislative powers. The Constitution thus does not spell out who is supposed to do what.
Any conflict between laws that may arise is to be resolved by the application of the so-called ‘national overrides”, in terms of which national legislation will prevail should any one of a number of circumstances happens. All this tends, in Robson’s view, to have an inhibiting effect on the provinces’ legislative performance.
There are other factors to be noted that may hold back provincial legislative performance. One such factor is the highly centralised structure and ideological stance of the country’s dominant political party, the ANC.
Because of the tendency to concentrate political influence, policymaking and legislative actions at the centre, provincial governments controlled by the party may have little inclination to assert themselves as sub-national governments. Then again, provinces are not obliged to legislate.
An ANC-controlled province may well conclude that it is not necessary for it to adopt much legislation of its own, as matters of concern to it are already regulated adequately by existing legislation, bearing in mind that all provinces are consulted formally in the development of national legislation that affects them.
Another factor may be the lukewarm attitude evinced by the ANC as regards the place and role of provinces in the general system of government. To do away with the provinces or to deprive them of their legislatures would require fundamental changes to the Constitution. For a number of reasons this is not a viable option.
Robson suggests that the perceived problems concerning the functioning of the provinces could best be addressed by delineating properly the responsibilities to be discharged by the national and the provincial governments respectively. This could be done by the development and activation of blueprints as a cooperative effort under the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act.
Using an administrative approach, it is envisaged that each blueprint would deal with a specific public function and focus on the key aspects of legislation, service provision, coordination and control.
Ian Robson is a professor extraordinarius in Unisa’s department of public administration and management in the college of economic and management sciences. After a long career in the administrative echelons of the public service he retired in 1996. At the time he was the public service commissioner. After his retirement he worked as a public management consultant and also obtained a doctorate in public administration. His thesis dealt with the assignment of responsibilities to levels or spheres of government in South Africa