Whatever the outcome of the election in Zimbabwe this weekend, Robert Mugabe has a tough time ahead
David Moore
Call me an individualist, but the crisis Zimbabwe faces for the next few weeks could be fixed by one man: President Robert Mugabe.
Even if a huge Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) or Zanu-PF majority floods the modest colonial architecture of the legislative house with overwhelming egos, the constitutional imbroglio in which Zimbabwe is entangled enables Mugabe alone to have inordinate say over its destiny.
The extra British high commission staff flown in from London to guess their way through the current crisis must be thinking the same thing – that everything depends on Mugabe.
So must the hundreds of international observers who must make a clear call on whether it has been a free and fair election, particularly in the case of a Zanu-PF victory or a too-close MDC win.
There seems already to be enough evidence of violent intimidation and coercion, gerrymandering, harassed monitors, and unbelievable stultification in the journalism reaching the rural areas to warrant a negative call on the observers’ scorecard.
There is also the question of how the elections are to be carried out on the nearly 850 occupied farms where the past few months’ land invasions have confused the legitimate desire for colonial and post-colonial redress with electoral opportunism and thuggery. Add to that an answer of how the 13E000 votes of the soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (perhaps to be channelled to well- barracked constituencies) are to be counted and you have further room for a poor international grade on the elections scale.
One then asks: what effect would a resounding “no free and fair elections” have? The financial squeeze is already almost as tight as it can get, and we know what happens in Iraq-like sanctions situations: the people lose and the dictators hang on. All a “no” can do is add to the list of moral imperatives with which Mugabe will have to deal.
However, if local extra-parliamentary opposition to a Zanu-PF victory stemming from coercion and rigging were to ensue, the combination of international censure and mass action – perhaps a general strike – would lead to interesting possibilities.
The anger of MDC cadres over Zanu-PF intimidation is already visible. A few Zanu-PF youths foolhardy enough to walk into last Sunday’s 35E000-strong MDC rally in Harare’s Rufaro Stadium after some of their mates had abducted MDC youths were lucky to live. Thus, even a large Zanu-PF majority could mean extra-parliamentary opposition.
Robert Gabriel Mugabe is very much the lonely man at the top, and he has lots of tricks to call up in the next few days. Some of them are relatively little-known, while others have been long exposed to the lights of human rights activists and constitutional lawyers.
Legally, Mugabe can stay on as president for another two years unless two-thirds of the 150 parliamentarians decide against it. But only 120 of those parliamentarians will have actually won elections. Mugabe effectively appoints 30 members – 20% – to the legislature. Of those, 10 are indirectly elected chiefs, and they won’t be there until July. The rest are “professionals” and already named provincial governors.
Thus, if 61 seats go to the MDC, Mugabe will have suffered only a “political” and moral defeat.
Presented with this option, he will probably hang around awhile, hoping Zanu- PF will stay with him long enough to garner another six presidential years after 2002. Yet there is little evidence Zanu-PF will stick with him.
The past few months of primary nominations evidenced the dissent of a new generation of Zanu-PF politicians. It is said that after Zanu-PF lost the constitutional referendum in February, the president was not applauded as he arrived for his morning-after Cabinet meeting. That had never happened before.
Reports from at least one candidates’ meeting say that he was told to resign. In short, the old Mugabe magic may not work. The MDC may be forced to welcome some Zanu-PF refugees of all shapes and sizes.
If the MDC wins a political majority and Mugabe fails to acknowledge the popular will, watch for a combination of street action and the possibility of a coalition between the MDC and sections of Zanu-PF to get the required two-thirds to oust Mugabe constitutionally.
The other eye should watch the president’s consultations with the so- called war veterans and his national security council. They are his last redoubt. If he can’t see himself descending to political deal-making, he may take his own extra-parliamentary action.
The military gamble may be there if the MDC wins over 75 seats. Then the man who was once called “archangel Gabriel” in Parliament would lose his heavenly mandate. He’d have no moral authority and a limited time on the presidential throne.
The MDC’s promises to establish commissions on corruption, truth and justice, and land suggest a gruelling few years ahead on all those counts. From the days of the liberation war through the Matabeleland massacres, to the shopping and house-building styles of his wife, Zimbabwe’s president has cold blood and hot money on his hands.
The exposure at a land commission of the 17 farms owned by a prominent war veteran could even unhinge Mugabe’s last alliance with forces outside his walls – the remnants of the war veterans. Their march inside his walls (they got in because the army refused to fire on peers) in late 1997 forced him to pay out the huge pensions that led to the early 1998 5% surtax … that led to the riots in the streets … that led to the current economic and financial crisis (in combination with the deprivations of structural adjustment) … and so the story goes on.
Some MDC sources have suggested that if Mugabe wanted to avoid all that, he could agree to leave the throne nicely or be ushered to a country of his choice, in much the same manner as he hosted Ethiopia’s Mengistu Haile Mariam after the latter’s fall from grace. Others have suggested he has lost even that chance.
Both of these scenarios assume that Mugabe would not call on the military to execute the rumoured plans for the coup that would then install him in power. Alternatively, if he did, the middle and lower levels of the armed forces, at best angry at the Congo war or at least neutral, would stymie their warlords’ conspiracy.
To avoid these hassles, he might well resign and call a quick presidential election: Professor Masipula Sithole’s Public Opinion Institute suggests that 62% of Zimbabweans prefer that option. But if he shirked at the poll’s indication that 50% of those citizens would vote for the MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai against only 38% for him, perhaps a general strike would help him change his mind.
David Moore is a lecturer in economic history and development studies at the University of Natal