The leaders of Germany and France this week highlighted the gap separating Britain and the United States from some of their closest allies on policy towards Iraq, saying they could not support an attack without a United Nations mandate.
At the end of talks in the German city of Schwerin, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder and French President Jacques Chirac insisted that clear UN approval was necessary.
They reiterated their position amid the growing evidence that US President George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have agreed in principle on an invasion, perhaps before the year is out.
Blair has persistently ducked the issue when questioned about the need for a new UN Security Council resolution, though he has implied that it would not be necessary.
Although he said at his press conference last week that any action would be taken in accordance with international law, he added that President Saddam Hussein had already breached 23 UN resolutions.
The Bush administration has made it clear that a US attack on Iraq would not require any further UN mandate.
Chirac urged Saddam to agree ”very, very quickly” to the return of UN weapons inspectors, and his warning appeared to indicate that he feels he has slightly greater room for manoeuvre than that enjoyed by Schroder.
Schroder, recalling that German military deployment abroad needed parliamentary approval, said: ”There is no majority, on one side or the other, for taking part in military action without approval by the UN.”
Asked whether such an attack could still be avoided, Chirac said: ”I do not want to imagine an attack against Iraq, an attack which — were it to happen — could only be justified if it were decided on by the Security Council.”
Meanwhile, Julian Borger reports from Washington, the US was reported this week to be considering a daring new war plan to oust Saddam, by unleashing a surprise direct assault on Baghdad and other key command centres with the aim of decapitating the regime in a few days.
The ”inside out” plan, reversing the tactics used in the Gulf War by striking at the heart of the regime first, is the latest in a series to be leaked to the press in recent weeks amid a very public build-up of administration rhetoric and flexing of Pentagon muscles.
Observers differed over whether the leaks reflected strategic disagreements in Washington or a deliberate propaganda campaign aimed at intimidating and confusing Baghdad.
The plan, as described in The New York Times, would fly US troops into Baghdad on the first day of the campaign, delivering a powerful shock to the Saddam regime and to the Iraqi people, convincing them in one bold stroke that the US was determined to topple the dictator.
The inside out approach would also be aimed at killing Saddam or at least isolating him before he could unleash any working biological or chemical weapons in his arsenal. It would also avoid massing large numbers of US troops along Iraq’s borders where they could be vulnerable to weapons of mass destruction.
However, the plan could well involve US soldiers fighting their way through the streets of Baghdad against Iraq’s most determined troops, the special republican guard, instead of pushing towards the capital in the hope that the regime would implode before US forces reached the outskirts of the city.
The debate on how to get rid of Saddam has been under way in earnest since January when the Bush administration decided to pursue a policy of ”regime change” in Iraq.
Some analysts said this week that the new inside out plan could have been leaked in order to counter suggestions by apprehensive US officers that an attack on Iraq was too huge and risky an undertaking compared to the current policy of containment.
John Pike, head of GlobalSecurity.org, a military and intelligence think-tank, suggested there was an element of disinformation behind the leaks.
”One element of the operation if I were planning it would be strategic deception as to the plan and the timing,” Pike said. ”If I wanted 50 000 men to march on Baghdad, I would certainly do everything in my power to give the impression that I was going to wait months while I put together a force of a quarter million.”
Five options to oust Saddam
1 The coup: President George W Bush has ordered the CIA to pursue the ”dirty tricks” route to getting rid of Saddam Hussein, of which the most plausible is fomenting a coup within the dictator’s inner circle. But the last significant CIA-inspired coup attempt in 1996 was a disaster. The plot was compromised from the start by Iraqi government infiltrators and untold numbers of plotters and hapless suspects were executed. Even CIA director George Tenet reckons a coup has only a 15% chance of success.
2 The Afghan model: Let Iraqi opposition groups do the fighting with heavy United States air support and a few thousand special forces troops on the ground. This was the plan promoted by General Wayne Downing, Bush’s counter-terrorism adviser, but it has fallen out of favour in Washington owing to misgivings over the unity and military strength of the rebels. Downing has since resigned.
3 The Gulf War option: Using up to 250 000 troops supported by devastating air power and technology that is far more sophisticated and deadly than Gulf War-era equipment. The attack would be mounted from Kuwait and Qatar, but would also need access to Iraq’s long land borders with Jordan or Saudi Arabia. No one doubts that the Iraqi army would crumble in the face of the onslaught, but such a large force would take months to amass and would make an easy target for a chemical or biological weapon.
4 The surprise attack: This would use between 50 000 and 80 000 troops that could be moved into the region gradually and surreptitiously, under guise of exercises and troop rotations. It would advance speedily towards Baghdad, seizing cities in the south that would become bases for an internal revolt. That revolt would theoretically trigger a nationwide army mutiny. But it could still give Saddam time to unleash weapons of mass destruction in a last desperate throw of the dice.
5 The inside-out attack: Strike at Baghdad and Iraq’s other command centres first to ”decapitate” Saddam’s forces and minimise the possibility of a biological or chemical response against US forces or Israel. A high-risk strategy that would expose US troops to fierce street fighting against Saddam’s best troops. — (c) Guardian Newspapers