Two of the key figures in the genesis of the arms-deal scandal — Patricia de Lille and Andrew Feinstein — went public again this week, fanning the embers of a corruption storm that has been smouldering for nine years.
Feinstein, the former African National Congress (ANC) leader of Parliament’s public accounts watchdog Scopa, resigned when the party moved to curtail investigations into the arms deal. He is now living in London. He was in South Africa this week to launch his new book, After the Party, which contains dramatic new revelations on the affair.
And De Lille alleged in Parliament this week that she had evidence of three payments by warship supplier Thyssen-Krupp on January 29 1999, each of R500 000, to the ANC, to the Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund and to the Community Development Foundation, a Mozambique charity associated with Mandela’s wife, Graça Machel.
The payments were allegedly made into foreign accounts with Credit Suisse First Boston.
The three entities have denied any knowledge of the payments, while Thyssen has declined to comment.
But it is the details revealed by Feinstein that are likely to prompt new scrutiny of the arms deal and the investigation process.
In his book Feinstein alleges:
- That former defence minister Joe Modise received more than R10-million from a variety of bidders;
- That a report submitted by Scorpions investigators to their bosses recommended that arms deal corruption involving the ANC itself should be investigated. This was driven by a number of factors, Feinstein writes, including ”trips that the party’s treasurer general, Mendi Msimang, made to Switzerland to meet the successful bidders”; and
- That Italian submarine bidders Fincantiere were told they had won the contract, but were informed later that they had been dropped in favour of the Germans. They were offered the chance to ”better the Germans” via a payment of $15-million in bribes.
Feinstein points out that this is the same sum under investigation by the German authorities, in relation to an amount allegedly solicited by South Africa’s former chief of acquisitions, Chippy Shaik. Shaik has denied the allegation.
Feinstein also contradicts public claims by senior government figures that there was no attempt to interfere with the probe into the arms deal once Parliament had authorised a joint investigation team (JIT).
He writes: ”I was told by someone from the JIT about a meeting with the president at which they— were told who they could and could not investigate.”
Elsewhere he claims: ”It was made clear to investigators that a shadowy financier close to Mbeki and Zuma who has played an ongoing role in financing the ANC, was off limits.”
One investigator told Feinstein: ”The hand of the presidency over the investigation was palpable.”
He notes: ”For instance, the charge sheet for the arrest of Schabir Shaik was drawn up to charge both Shaik and Zuma. When presented to Bulelani Ngcuka, he is alleged to have responded: ‘I will charge the deputy president only if my president agrees.”’
Recounting how he was hauled before the party’s top brass after Parliament had authorised its own investigation, Feinstein writes: ”I was given a brief opportunity to try to explain the prima facie evidence we had and the process we were following.
”Within a few minutes [Minister in the Presidency Essop] Pahad had launched into a ferocious diatribe, spluttering ‘Who the fuck do you think you are, questioning the integrity of the government, the ministers and the president?’ Pointing aggressively at me, he shouted that we should simply withdraw the resolution.”